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Abstract
After the World War era, there has been a gradual rise in wealth Inequality in
industrialized economies, with wealth in the United States becoming more con-
centrated than wealth in most European economies.[1] Current research on wealth
inequality attributes the main reason for the long-run divergence in wealth inequal-
ity to the r− g gap, where r is the rate of return on capital and g is the economy’s
growth rate. Nonetheless, speculations about capital and the rate of return on
capital, it’s definition and measurement, have raised concerns about deriving the
r− g gap. Using the United States, post World Wars, as a study case, my disserta-
tion addresses the concentration of wealth by investigating income from property
ownership. Specifically it focusses on 3 main issues: (i) I provide an alternative
measure for the Piketty r − g gap by deriving the rate of reutrn on property own-
ership (rp), and show that the gap between the long-run rate of return on property
ownership (r̄p) and the long-run growth in the economy (ḡ) explains the fast rise in
wealth inequality captured in the U.S. economy. (ii) I show that when traditional
models, that focus on production only, are used to capture the natural behavior of
wealth inequality, wealth inequality tends to be explosive over the long-run. (iii)
Since property ownership is not confined to production alone, I implement the new
measure of rp − g into a simple model of wealth accumulation, that takes into ac-
count both productive and non-productive property in generating wealth. I find
that wealth inequality in the U.S. economy is more concentrated than suggested by
Thomas Piketty.
JEL Classification: D31, E01, E21
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1 Introduction
Many economist believed that John Bates Clark solved the income distribution problem.
In fact, he only reduced it to a wealth distribution problem. Wealth inequality in indus-
trialized and developed economies, over the past five decades, have become an issue of
tremendous importance both politically and intellectually. The topic is of significant im-
portance because wealth inequality impacts the overall growth prospects of an economy
and its use of its resources, it impacts inequality in other sectors of the economy, and it
has tremendous global significance, especially when talking about economies that impact
the global economy. According to Atkinson et al. [5], people have a sense of fairness and
care about the distribution of economic resources across society. As a result, all advanced
economies have set in place redistributive policies such as taxation, which effectively re-
distribute a significant share of National Product across income groups. Nonetheless,
even with these redistributive efforts, the concentration of wealth has been on the rise
and shows no sign of declining.1 Politically, there has been growing pressures on policy
makers to address the concerns of rising wealth inequality. For example, the current
U.S. policy debate is centered around the issue of growing large government deficits. To
eliminate these large deficits, it is required that the government raise tax revenues in
the up coming years (future). However, the problem for most policy makers is, ”who do
you tax?” With the significant decline in middle income earners in the U.S., according
to the U.S. Census Bureau at the Minnesota Population Center (IPUMS), should policy
makers raise taxes on lower-income earners, middle income earners or the wealthy? Or
concurrently, should higher taxes be imposed on wealth? The questions of who bears the
cost of the tax incidence - whether the wealthy or everyone else - is extremely important
and needs to be addressed. Also, with the constant rise in the share of wealth by the
wealthy, it is important that we understand the cause of the rise in wealth concentration
over time. Academically, the standard response by many economists in the past has been
to dismiss the importance of the rise in wealth inequality. Nonetheless, with the recent
1See Piketty [33] for a detailed analysis of rising wealth inequality in the United States and in other
developed economies.
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contribution to the literature by Piketty [33] and co-authors Atkinson, Saez, Zucman etc.,
in the book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, there has been a growing importance
for economic researchers to address the topic again. What is the driving force of the rise
in wealth inequality over the past decades? Should there be concern for rising wealth in-
equality? How is economic growth affected by rising wealth inequality? These questions
need to be answered, nontheless, to answer them more needs to be done to understand
the constant rise in the inequality gap over the past 5 decades. It is then that policy
makers can adequately implement policies to redistribute wealth, or efficiently reallocate
resourcees in the economy.
Attempts to explain the persistent increase in wealth inequality over time have yielded
that the long run level of wealth inequality in most developed economies is determined by
the difference between the rate of return on capital (r) and the growth rate in income per
capita (g). See Piketty [33, 34]. However, there have been concerns about the definition
of the rate of return on capital, r. If the gap between r and g is a major determinant
of the long run structure of inequality, then it is important to derive a measure of r
that captures profits, rents, dividends, interest, royalties, and capital gains. My research
revisits the topic of wealth inequality after the World Wars, by specifically addressing the
question: “What determines the long run level of wealth inequality?” I show that the long
run level of wealth inequality is dependent on income from property ownership. That
is, I show that the difference between the rate of return on property ownership and the
growth rate in income per capita better explains the dynamics of wealth inequality. So
why post World Wars? Piketty and Saez [36, 37] find that since the eighteenth century,
the only period during world history where there is a decline in wealth inequality for
developed economies (France, Sweden, Japan, United States etc.) was during the World
Wars. Besides this period, which they refer to as the world war shock, inequality has
been on the rise, eventhough the rise in inequality is substantially less compared to the
fall in inequality. It is important to focus on the period after the world wars mainly
because, the definition of the economic systems has substantially changed overtime: from
an agricultural society to an industrialized society, to a capitalist society, to a financial
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capitalist society. It is therefore important to address periods in which the structural
change in the dynamics of the economy is not subtantially different. Using the United
States as a case study, I use after tax historical data from the U.S. National Income
Accounts to derive income from property ownership and I show that the level of inequality
in the U.S. economy is determined by the difference between the rate of return on income
from property ownership and growth in income per capita, i.e. rp − g. I find that the
rp−g gap is significantly wider than Piketty’s r−g, and that the wider gap has significant
implications on wealth inequality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on the topic
of wealth inequality. In section 3, I derive income from property ownership, and present
and analyze trends in the rate of retrun on property ownership over time. In section 4,
I present detail analysis of the data used and section 6 offers concluding comments and
extensions of my research.
3
2 Literature Review
2.1 Recent Developments in Wealth Inequality
The question, how do we explain the distribution of wealth, has been on the spotlight
of economic research since John Bates Clark’s [10] book, “The Distribution of Wealth,”
the theories of Kuznets’ [18] paper, “Economic Growth and Income Inequality,” as well
as Kaldor’s [16] paper, “Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth.” These papers,
especially Kuznets’ theory,2 greatly influenced the literature on inequality, allowing a
multitude of research papers to empirically and theoretically attempt to capture the rela-
tionship between various forms of inequality and economic growth. Kuznets’ hypothesis
indicated that income or wealth inequality should follow an inverse-U relationship in
response to industrialization, economic growth or technological advancement. This fos-
tered an influx of research papers that attempted to understand the natural process and
behavior of inequality overtime, but resulted in conclusions that remained ambigious.
These studies either found statistically significant evidence in support of the Kuznets’
curve or refuted the hypothesis. Some even found no relationship between inequality
and economic growth.3 Although the Kuznets seminal paper vastly contributed to the
inequality literature, it fell short in explaining the persistent rise in inequality over the
past five decades. According to Piketty and Saez [36], today, the Kuznets curve is widely
held to have doubled back on itself, especially in the case of the United States, with a
period of falling inequality during the first half of the twentieth century being succeeded
by a very sharp rise in inequality since the 1950s. With the current advancements seen
in technology, and with industries and individuals leap-frogging technology, according to
the Kuznets’ theory, one would think that there should be convergence in equality over
time. Nonetheless, that has not been the case for many developed economies including
the United States.4 Stiglitz [42] refers to the Kuznets theory as an attempt to explain
2According Kuznets’ theory (Kuznets’ Curve) [18], inequality first increases in response to industrial-
ization, economic development, or technological advancement, then decreases over time, resulting in an
inverted-U relationship between growth and inequality.
3See Persson and Tabelini [31], Perotti [30], Li and Zou [20], Forbes [13], Barro [6], Banerjee and
Duflo [12], and Atkinson [3] for research on inequality and growth
4See Piketty [33, 34] and related works by Emmanuel Sael and Grabriel Zucman
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old stylized facts that do not explain the current rise in inequality in the now developed
economies. In his book, ”The Price of Inequality,” Stiglitz [40] explains that the reason
for this persistent rise in inequality can be attributed to an increase in rent seeking ac-
tivities. Piketty [33] indicates that the Kuznets curve theory was observed mainly for
the wrong reasons, and that its empirical underpinnings were extremely fragile. Kuznets
[19] produced a number of top income share series covering 1913 to 1948. At the be-
ginning of this sample period, inequality is observed to to be rising and then declines
mainly because of the world wars. It no surprise then that Kuznet found an inverted-U
relationship. Piketty [36] criticizes the Kuznets curve indicating that his series are not
fully satisfactory from a technical viewpoint, and they do not allow the analysis of very
high incomes as the top group analyzed by Kuznets is the top percentile. Also, the sharp
reduction in inequality that is observed in all rich countries between 1914 and 1945 was
due to the world wars, and the violent economic and political shocks they entailed, and
not the automatic process or course of inequality (Piketty [33]). Therefore, the “bell
shape” relationship between inequality and growth that was popularized, has nothing to
do with the natural or automatic process of the behavior of inequality. In conclusion,
Kuznets theory was formalized over a period that was largely accidental.
New evidence provided by Thomas Piketty’s book “Capital in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury” and other supporting papers with co-authors, Emmanuel Saez, Gabriel Zucman
and others, have completely revolutionized the literature on income and wealth inequal-
ity, with the most noticeable contribution being the new and extensive data that they
use, mainly administrative tax records, to study inequality at the very top of income
and wealth distribution.5 Piketty and Saez [36] extended the methodology of Kuznets by
building a homogenous series on top shares of pre-tax incomes and wages in the United
States covering 1913 to 1998. Based on this, they contruct annual series of top shares
of salaries for the top fractile of the salary distribution. They also analyze top capital
income earners. In constructing these series, the authors are able to study inequality at
the top of income and wealth distribution. See Piketty [33, 34] and the World Top Income
5See the World Top Incomes Database [1] for a complete list of countries studied
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Database [1] for top income data and analysis on other countries. Piketty’s [33] findings
reveal the following facts about inequality. First, the distribution of wealth, which he
refers to as income from capital, is much more concentrated than the distribution of in-
come from labor (income inequality.) That is, in all industrialized nations, the researchers
find that the least wealthy half of the population own virtually nothing, between 0 to 5
percent of total wealth; the top decile of wealth owners own an astonishing majority of
wealth, between 60 to 90 percent; and the remainder of the population (the middle class)
own between 5 to 35 percent of all wealth. This compares to the top centile and decile’s
share of income being between 5 to 20 percent and 25 to 45 percent respectively. Clearly,
there is large gap between the concentration of wealth (capital according to Piketty) and
the concentration of income (labor income.)
Secondly, wealth inequality in Europe is dramatically much lower today (2010) than
anytime before 1960, and is much lower than wealth inequality in the United State.
According to their findings, in the early nineteenth century Europe, the top centile and
decile of wealth owners, owned approximately 50 percent and 80 percent of the nations
wealth respectively. Compared to the United States, the top centile and decile owned
approximately 25 percent and 60 percent respectively. Until the mid-twentieth century,
the wealth concentration was still higher in Europe than the United States, peaking at
55 and 90 percent for the top 1 percent and 10 percent of wealth owners in Europe, and
45 and 80 percent for the top 1 and 10 percent in the United States. Wealth inequality
decreased between 1910 and 1950 for both Europe and the United States but much less
in the United States than in Europe. By 2010, the top centile’s share of total wealth
was close to 35 percent and exceeded 70 percent for the top decile’s share in the United
States. In Europe however, the top centile owned approximately 25 percent of wealth,
whiles the top decile owned approximately 65 percent of wealth as of 2010. That is, the
percieved equitable United States economy had become less equitable in its distribution
of wealth than its European counterparts. Third but not he least, Piketty and coauthors
find that wealth inequality has been rising over the past 5 to 6 decades even though the
rise seems small in comparison to the decline during the world wars. This finding holds
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the U.S. as an exception since there wasn’t much of a decline in inequality as in Europe
(United Kingdom and France) during the wars. That is, during the World Wars the top
decile of wealth owners in Europe had their share of national wealth fall from 90 percent
in 1910 to 60 percent in 1970. For the United States economy, this was comparable to a
decline in wealth ownership from 80 percent in 1910 to 65 percent in 1950. The decline
for the United States was less severe, but currently it is close to the highest level of
inequality attained in the first part of the twentieth century. Last but more importantly,
the authors show that the rise in wealth inequality throughout history is attributable to
the difference between the rates of return on capital (r) and the growth rate of income
in the economy (g). This latter fact, “r > g implies inequality”, has been a topic of
current debate among economist, posing the question: “Did Piketty get Inequality right
or wrong?“ Even though, there are shortcomings to the r > g analysis, their work serves
as a seminal contribution to the inequality literature, and for later developments in the
literature. Their work certainly highlight the growing importance of inequality in the
economy, and whether we should be concerned or not.
This paper addresses concerns and questions about the latter two stated contribu-
tions by Piketty. First, I address wealth inequality in the U.S. economy, since it serves as
an anomaly to the decline in inequality during the world wars, and also because wealth
inequality in the economy is much closer to the level it was during the late nineteenth
century and early twentieth century. Secondly, I address the shortcomings of “r > g
implies inequality,” because Piketty’s definition of capital is problematic, both as a mea-
sure of capital, and a measure of wealth (Weil [45]). More specifically, the paper revisits
the topic of wealth inequality in the United States, post World Wars, by address the
question: “What determines the long-run level of wealth inequality?” In answering the
question, I derive the rate of return on property ownership (rp) for the United States
economy as an alternative measure to Piketty’s return on capital. I show that it is the
difference between the return on property ownership (rp) and the growth rate of income
(g) that explains the fast rise in wealth inequality, and not the rate of return on capital
(r) as asserted by Piketty [33]. Property ownership is more appropriate when studying
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wealth inequality over time. Also, I show that this alternative measure for Piketty’s “r”
is immune to the argument encompassing Piketty’s use of capital and enforces the role
played by inheritance in producing inequality. Last, the paper enforces the importance
of capital gains in the U.S. economy, and that it significantly contributes both to the
dynamics of property ownership and the divergence of wealth.
2.2 Wealth Inequality in the United States
There are clear differences between the trajectories of wealth inequality in the United
States and in other economies in Europe.6 Wealth Inequality in the U.S. has been on the
rise since 1950 (Piketty [33]). This raises concerns as people fear that wealth inequality
will reach heights comparable to the level of inequality in the late nineteenth century
or early twentieth century Europe. One can already assume that the U.S. economy has
reached those heights of inequality, if not surpassed it. The first reason for focusing
on the U.S. economy is because wealth inequality, currently, surpasses that of any other
industrialized nation. Comparing wealth concentration in Europe (France and the United
Kingdom) and the United States, the main finding by Piketty and Zucman (2015), is that
wealth concentration in the nineteenth century was much less extreme in the U.S. than
it was in Europe.7 However, over the course of the twentieth century, this ordering has
reversed. This is what the authors refer to as the Great Inequality Reversal: That is,
wealth concentration in the U.S. is now significantly higher than it is in Europe. Their
estimates show that the United States has almost returned to its early twentieth-century
wealth concentration level.8 This makes the U.S. an interesting case as it sets itself apart
from the other countries studied. Based on the analysis of Piketty [33], the US never
reached the extreme level of wealth concentration of the nineteenth century and early
twentieth century Europe, where the top decile owned 90 percent or more of wealth.
However, the economy might be heading in that direction. Secondly, the official U.S.
6For work on Sweden see Waldenstrom [44], For work on the U.K see Atkinson [4], for France see
Piketty [32]
7The explanation provided by Piketty (2014a) was that, the U.S. was a relative young economy when
it came to wealth accumulation.
8In the 1920s, the top decile owned 80 percent of wealth, and in 2012 it is about 75 percent. A similar
relationship is observed for the top centile of wealth owners.
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accounts data from both the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and the
Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) do not directly follow the System of National Accounts
(SNA) guidelines,9 which most industrialized nations follow. This creates comparability
problems with other economies. By focusing on the U.S. economy alone, I am able to
eliminate the problem of reconstructing the data to fit international standard, thereby
avoiding the loss of information. The other reason for focusing on the United States
economy is because of the growing importance of its financial system. Financial capitalism
places importance on shares (assets) and share prices (asset prices) which usually do
not reflect production but significantly contribute to wealth acquisition through interest
payments or capital gains.
2.3 The Role Played by r>g
It is important to note that r > g is not the only or primary reason for considering changes
in wealth over time, nor is it the primary reason for forecasting the path of inequality in
the future (Piketty [35]). There are several factors that vastly affect wealth inequality,
which Piketty refers to as wealth shock. These include family shocks, age shock, demo-
graphic shocks, shocks to the rate of return, labor market shocks, taste shocks, etc. In
conjunction with these shocks, the role of r > g solely explains the long run level of
wealth inequality. Specifically, a higher r− g gap will tend to greatly amplify the steady
state inequality of wealth distribution that mainly arises out of a given mixture of shocks,
including labor income shocks (Piketty [35]). So then wealth inequality will always con-
verge towards a finite level. However, the finite inequality level will be a steeply rising
function of the r − g gap.10 Even though a strong argument is made in support of the
fact that the gap r − g is central to determining the long run behavior of inequality,
several concerns need to be addressed: (i) Piketty’s definition of capital is misleading
and hence resulting in estimates of inequality that might be overstated or understated.
9The System of National Accounts [23] is the internationally agreed standard set of recommenda-
tions on how to compile measures of economic activity. The SNA describes a coherent, consistent and
integrated set of macroeconomic accounts in the context of a set of internationally agreed concepts,
definitions, classifications and accounting rules.
10See Piketty [33] chapter 10, Piketty [34], and Piketty and Zucman [38] section 5.4 for the theoretical
evidence of the inequality amplification of r − g
9
Piketty defines capital as “the sum total of nonhuman assets that can be owned and
exchanged on some market.” This definition of capital ignores the value of human capital,
and transfer-wealth, which have grown enormously over the past years, and also ignores
the possibility that wealth can be accumulated through rents. The assumption backing
the definition is that, all capital is used in the production process, which is not the case.
Weil [45] states that, “the central element of Piketty’s approach to measurement is that
the concepts usually classified as productive capital (the input into production that re-
sults from past investment) and wealth (claims on current and future consumption) can
both be measured by a single variable, for which he uses the term capital. However,
there exists evidence of mismeasurement of Piketty’s capital.”11 (ii) Piketty uses capital
and wealth interchangeably, assuming that capital equals wealth. That is, by assuming
that all capital is used in the production process, the only means of attaining wealth is
by saving (accumulating capital). Clearly, the concepts of capital and wealth are very
distinct and should not be assumed to be the same. Kanbur and Stiglitz [17] indicate
that what Piketty and others measure as wealth, is a measure of control over resources,
not the measure of capital in the sense that it is used in the production function. There
is a vast distinction between capital, an input to production, and wealth, thought of as
assets including land and the capitalized value of other rents, which give command over
purchasing power. (iii) If capital equals wealth, and all capital is used in the production
process, then r and g are not independent. That is, they are endogenously determined.
So then Piketty’s “r− g implies inequality” might not be as straight forwards as he puts
it. By using the alternative measure, the rate of return on property ownership, this pa-
per addresses the outlined flaws in the use of capital as defined by Piketty. Consider the
following cases:12
Case I: Consider the case of all sea front property on the French Rivera. As demand
11Weil [45] indicates that the mismeasurement comes from comparing Piketty’s data to the Penn
World Tables (version 8.0), where capital stock are measured using the perpetual inventory method with
depreciation rates varying by asset types. For more on this see Inklaar and Timmer (2013). Also, an
obvious source of mismeasurement error in the quantity of capital is changes in asset prices.
12Case 1 and 2 are directly taken from Kanbur and Stiglitz (2015)
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for these properties increase, the value of the sea front properties bid up. The current
owners will get rents from their ownership of the fixed factor. Their wealth will go up and
their ability to command purchasing power in the economy will rise. However, the actual
physical input into production does not increase. All else constant, national output will
not rise.
Case II: Consider the case where a government gives an implicit guarantee to bail out
banks. This will be capitalized into the value of shares, creates rents for the shareowners,
and increases their wealth. This will result in rising inequality, which is obvious without
going through the conventional production function analysis. The rents once created will
provide further resources for rentiers to lobby political systems to maintain their further
increase in rents.
Case III: An agricultural landowner lobbies for a change in zoning laws so he can sell
his land as commercial land. Once such a law is passed, that leads to an appreciation of
the value of his land, which leads to an increase in the owner’s wealth. This results in an
increase in the landowner’s wealth without going through the conventional production
function analysis.
All three cases clearly show that wealth can be amassed without a change in the
capital input to production, which is very evident in the financial capitalist society. It is
the property owners that benefit from the increase in the value of their assets. In short,
wealth accumulation is directly linked to accumulating property. According to El-Hodiri
(2015), the history of wealth and wealth inequality is a history of property ownership and
not capital used in the production process. Continuing, I derive income from property
ownership, which is immune to the arguments encompassing the definition of Piketty’s
capital, captures the idea of rents (economic term for unearned revenue), as property
can be obtained legally or illegally, and strengthens the role played by inheritance in
producing inequality.
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3 Deriving Income from Property Ownership
3.1 Definition
According to Piketty [33], the rate of return on capital measures the yield on capital over
the course of a year regardless of its legal form: that is, profits, rents, dividends, interest,
royalties, and capital gains expressed as a percentage of the value of capital invested. In
order to measure the rate of return on capital, Piketty defines capital income as the total
sum of housing capital income, corporate income, net foreign income, and capital income
in the non-corporate business sector. In the book ”Capital in the 21st Century,” Piketty
defines capital as the total sum of non-human assets that can be owned and exchanged
on some market. These definitions raise a couple of issues
i. Both productive capital and non-productive capital creates wealth, hence to assume
that all capital is productive is misleading.
ii. Human capital is excluded from Piketty’s definition of capital on the premise that
it cannot be owned by another person nor traded on a market. However, in today’s
world or advanced technological progress human capital cannot be ignored.
Measuring capital income based on Piketty’s classification can be hard to measure, espe-
cially because
i. Home owners who contact mortgages consume financial intermediate services (FISIM)
which are treated as intermediate consumption and there is cross country hetero-
geneity on how FISIM is measured
ii. The net operating surplus of the household sector only captures the income gener-
ated by household activities, but households do not own 100 percent stock of the
housing stock. There are variations in the share of households owned by corpora-
tions
iii. Rules determining whether an organization falls within the corporate or non cor-
porate business proves to be another issue at hand
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iv. Piketty assumes that return on government capital is implicitly zero. This is mainly
because public debt usually outweighs public capital. Nonetheless, public land is
significantly undervalued, and lastly,
v The measurement of National Income Accounts do not all meet the same standards
creating issues for comparision across countries.
To address these issues, I provide an alternative measure for Piketty’s capital income
by focusing on income from property ownership. According to the National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA), by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), income from
property ownership is the sum of interest income, dividend income and rental income.

















where Interest Income is the interest income from all sources, both monetary and imputed,
that is received by individual, by private and government employee retirement plans,
and by quasi-individuals. Dividend Income is from all sources including individuals,
private and government employee retirement plans, and by quasi-individuals, non-profit
institutions, and estates and trusts. Also, pension funds, some insurance reserves, and
private trust funds are considered to be the property of persons hence dividends received
by these institutions are included. Rental Income with capital consumption adjustment is
the net current-production income of persons from the rental of real property. It consists
of net income from the rental of tenant occupied housing by persons, the imputed net
income from the housing services of owner-occupied housing, and the royalty income of
persons from patents, copyrights, and the rights to natural resources. I also include data
fro persons engaged in the real estate business in rental income. That is, net income
from the rental of tenant occupied housing by corporations or the net income of tenant
occupied housing by partnerships and sole proprietors, which is not included in the BEA
13
definition of rental income. Capital Gains
This definition captures profits, rental income, interest, dividend, royalties, capital
gains, and rents more collectively than Piketty’s measure of capital income. It accounts
for income generated by all forms of property regardless of whether it is tangible or
intangible hence accounts for the property that is generated as a result of human capital.
By focusing on income from property ownership, I am able to eliminate the problem of
separating income into household, corporate, non-corporate or foreign income, and also
it is impervious to whether the income was made legally or illegally.
I give 2 alternative definitions for income from property ownership but it does not
change my analysis and conclusion. See Appendix A
3.2 The Rate of Return on Property Ownership
Over the entire period, after the world wars, the rate of return on property ownership,
r̂p, has been approximately 7.2 percent. The other two definitions show a long run rate
of return on property ownership of 7.6 and 7.7 percent respectively. Even though the
later estimates are much higher, I focus on equation (1) for my analysis, which provides
a more comprehensive definition for income from property ownership. See figure (1).
The estimate, rp is 2 percentage points higher than Thomas Piketty’s estimate of the
return to capital, r, for the U.S. economy. This difference has signicant implications
for the divergence of wealth inequality in the economy. With wealth inequality being a
rising function of both the rate of return on capital ownership, (r), and the growth rate
in GDP per capita, (g), a small gap between r and g can have destabilizing effects on
the structure and dynamics of social inequality (Piketty [38]). Therefore, with a higher
estimate, r̂p, the concentration of wealth in the U.S. economy is projected to be narrower
than projected by Piketty. Likewise, concerns about the gradual decline of g in the U.S.
economy posses another problem which further provides higher steady state levels of the
concentration in wealth. Since the 1960s, there has been a gradual decline in the growth
rate of income per capita per decade g. See section 3.4 for the analysis of r − g. By
comparing the long run rate of return on property ownership of 7.2 percent to the long
14
run growth rate in inomce per capita of 2 percent, it is evident that owning property

























Figure 1: Income from Property Ownership in the United States, 1949 - 2015
3.3 Composition of Income From Property Ownership
Interest income and current production income of sole proprietors and partnerships, and
of tax exempt coorporatives (proprietor’s income hence forth) are the most significant
contributors to income from property ownership in the U.S. Over the entire period of
study, interest income and proprietors’ income account for 35 percent and 32 percent
of income from property ownership respectively. This is equivalent to 10.8 percent and
9.7 percent of national income, respectively. The contribution interest income follows
an inverted-U pattern: Its contribution gradually rises from 16 percent in the 1950’s,
reaching a height of 55 percent in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, then gradually declining



















Figure 2: The Composition of Income from Property Ownership in the United States,
1949 - 2015
hand, the contribution of proprietor’s income to income from property ownership was
extremely high in the 1950s: 53 percent in 1950 and gradually declining to 20 percent in
the early 1980s. From 1985 to 2015 there is a gradual increase in its share from 20 percent
to 28 percent. Nonetheless this increase is less substantial to the decline in its share
right after the world wars. Similarly, the contribution of rental income follows the same
distinctive U-shaped curve as propritor’s income: High contribution is the 1950’s of about
12 percent, declining to 1 percent in the late 1980’s, and gradually increasing to about
13 percent of income from property ownership. Together, rental income and proprietor’s
income account for approximately 40 percent of income from property ownership over the
entire period. 13. Realized capital gains have become an increasingly important source of
income in the U.S. economy, accounting for about 3.6 percent of National Income over the
period 1950 - 2015, reaching a heights of 8.8 percent in 1986 and 7.7 percent in 2007.14.
13See Section 4 for a more detailed analysis of interest and rental income in the U.S. economy
14See Section 4 for more details on Capital Gains
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On average, capital gains account for 17 percent of income from property ownership.
The contribution by capital gains far outweigh the contribution by rental income alone,
except for years after the Great Recession of 2007.15 Realized capital gains accounts
for 11 percent of income from property ownership. Since the 1950’s this share has been
fairly constant. However, there are observed spikes in it contribution usually before a
reccession. Before the 2001 recession and 2007 recession, it accounted for 17 percent and
21 percent of income from property ownership respectively. Dividend income, like capital
gains, has been fairly stable over the years, and accounts for 12 percent of income from
property ownership in the U.S.. This is equivalent to 3.7 percent of National Income.
Nontheless, dividend income has been more persistent than capital gains which reacts
more substantially to expensions and recessions in the U.S. economy. See Figure 2 for a
breakdown of income from property ownership.
3.4 The rp − g Gap
Based on the derived income from property ownership, I find that the gap between the
long run rate of return on all assets (rp), whether used in the production process or left
to accrue interest over time, and the growth in income per capita g in the U.S. economy,
after the World Wars, is approximately 5 percent. Note that rp is the after tax rate
of return on property ownership. Figure 3 shows the yearly differnce between the rate
of return on property ownership and the growth in income per capita. Since 1950 the
difference has been approximately 5 percent admist the fluctions. In years like 1981 and
1986, the difference reached a maximum of 14 percent and 15 percent respectively. Where
as in years like 1987 and 2009, the difference reached a minimum of minus 11 percent
and minus 10 percent respectively. Since wealth accumulates over time, I take 10 year
averages to observe the changes in the rate of return of property ownership over the
decades. Figure 4 shows that with the exception of the 2000-2009 period, where the U.S.
economy is faced with two major recessions, the rate of return on property ownership is
persistently above above 6 percent. During the 1970’s and 1980’s it reached its maximum
15However, that is not the case when considering rental income plus proprietor’s income.
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Figure 3: The Difference between the Rate of Return on Property Ownership and Growth
in Income per Capita in the United States, 1949 - 2015
Even though, the rate of return to property ownership is seen to be higher than
the growth rate in income per capita in the U.S. economy, it is also evident that the
components of income from property ownership display the same relationship. That
is, the long-run rate of return on interest income, dividend income, rental income (plus
proprietor’s income) and capital gains exceeds the growth in income per capita by at least
2 percentage points. Over the entire period, the rate of return on interest bearing assets,
dividends, rental property, and capital gains were 8.01 percent, 7.96 percent, 6.2 percent,
and 7.9 percent respectively. Clearly, the ownership of property yields more returns than
earning a wage. See section 4 for a a detailed analysis of the components of income from
property ownership. What is interesting about the individual components are as follows:
(i) Figures 5 shows that between the 1950s and now (2015) the decade average rate of
16Decade averages are calculated according to the following years: 1950-59, 1960-69, 1970-79, 1980-89,
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Figure 4: The rp−p Gap: Rate of Return on Property Ownership and Growth in Income
per Capita in the United States, 1949 - 2015
return on income from the rental of property has persistently been rising from 4 percent
to approximately 8 percent. The only exception was during the 2000s where it dips to 4
percent. The dip in the 2000s was mainly due to the 2007 financial crises which resulted
in the loss of rental property nationwide. Nonetheless, by comparing the rate of return
on rental property to the growth in income per capita, it is evident that rentiers can
easily amass wealth over time. (ii) From the 1950s to 1980s the average rate of return on
interest bearing was approximately 11.5 percent. See figure 6. Nonetheless, there was a
significant decrease in the 90s to about 2 percent, and remains relatively low falling below
the growth in income per capita. Evidently, eventhough interest bearing assets were a
great means to create wealth, in the past 3 decades that has not been the case. The rate
of return on interest bearing assets from 1990 to 2015 has been approximately 2 percent.
(iii) Unlike interest income, the behavior of rate of return on income from dividends shows
more variability: increasing from 6 percent in the 1950’s to 11 percent in the 1980’s, then
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declining to almost 6 percent in the 2000’s. Currently, the average return on income
from dividends is well above 8 percent between the 2010 - 2015 period. See figure 7. (iv)
Realized capital gains present the most striking results in the U.S. economy.17 Figure
8 shows that over the decades the return on income from realized gains is well above
10 percent, reaching 15 percent in the 1990’s, and then declined to -0.1 percent in the
2000 - 2009 period. It is important to note that the decline can mainly be attributed to
property owners’ unwillingness to sell their assets during this period. Nonetheless, right
after the 2007 recession, the return on income from realized gains increased to well over
20 percent.
Paying attention to the components of income from property ownership, one can
decipher that rental income, dividend income and capital gains are the main channels
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Figure 5: Rental Income and Growth in Income per Capita in the United States, 1950-
2015
17I only used realized capital gains as data for unrealized capital is not readily available. However,
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Figure 8: Capital Gains and Growth in Income per Capita in the United States, 1950-2015
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4 Data
The Official U.S. National Accounts are organized in two parts: The flow of data are in the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), published by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), and the stock of assets and flow of financial assets are in the Flow of
Funds Accounts (FFA), puplished by the Federal Reserve Board. Since the U.S. statistics
does not follow the OECD national accounts data in the System of National Accounts
(SNA) framework, and I am not concerned about the comparability of the US data with
other countries, I am thoroughly able to investigate and capture the measure of income
from property, according to the U.S standards, by employing data from NIPA tables.
The NIPA tables do not contain data on capital gains, so then, I use available capital
gains data from the U.S. Department of the treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, and the
Congressional Budget Office. The following sub-sections provide more details about the
data used.
4.1 Dividend Income in the United States, 1950 - 2015
Data on dividend income is provided by the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA), by the BEA. There are no modifications made to the data. It is measured as
the gross dividend paid by U.S. corporations in cash and other assets, plus U.S. receipts
of dividend income from the rest of the world, net of dividend income payments to the
rest of the world, less dividends received by US corporations. See equation (2). It mainly
shows net dividend income arising from the ownership, in whole or part, of U.S. and
foreign corporations. From 1950 to 2015 the share of dividend income to national income
averages 3.7 percent. Its contibution to national income was approximately 3 percent
from 1950 to 1970, falling to approximately 2 percent over the 1970 to 1984 period,
and steadily rising since 1985.18 The share reached a height of 6.8 percent in 2007, and
maintained an average of 5.3 percent from 2000 to 2015.
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Figure 9: Dividend Income In the United States, 1949-2015
Dividend income as shown in the NIPA tables is from all sources including dividends
received by individuals, by private and government employee retirement plans and by
quasi-individuals, nonprofit institutions, and estates and trusts. Pension funds, some
insurance reserves, and private trust funds are considered to be the property of persons,
so dividends received by these institutions are included in personal dividend income.
Dividends received by mutual funds are generally redistributed to the mutual fund share-
holders, so these dividends can be considered to “pass through” to their owners and
are also included in personal dividend income.19 From equation 2, dividend payments
made by domestic industries are categorized into the following industries: (1) agricul-
ture, forestry and fishery; (2) mining; (3) contract construction; (4) manufacturing; (5)
19For more information see See more at: http://www.bea.gov/
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transportation and public utilities; (6) Wholesale rade; (7) retail trade and automobile
services; (8) finance, insurance and real estate and (9) service. The categorization for
the periods 1998 - 2014 changed to include more sub-divisions and groups.20. Figure 9,
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Figure 10: Growth in Dividend Income United States, 1949-2015
Dividend income in the U.S. has been growing at approximately 8 percent since 1950.
See Figure 9 and Figure 10. On average, 83 percent of this income is dividends paid by
U.S. corporations to domestic industries and residents, and 17 percent is dividends paid
to U.S. citizens by foreigners. See Figure 11. Even though the majority share of dividend
income is paid by U.S. corporations to domestic industries, it is important to note that
the share of dividend income paid to U.S. residents by the rest of the world has drastically
increased over the years. This places emphasis on the importance of property ownership
outside the U.S. economy that generates wealth within the U.S. economy. In 1950, the
20See NIPA tables 6.20A, 6.20B, 6.20C and 6.20D. Table 6.20D provides the different categorization
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Figure 11: Composition of Dividend Income in the United States, 1950-2015
share of dividend income paid by the rest of the world to U.S. residents, contributed 11
percent to total dividend. It currently contributes approximately 18 percent. Between
1960 and 1990, the foreign component of dividend income fluctuated between 20 to 30
percent, and declined to about 10 percent in the nineties. Starting 2000 it resumed a
steady rise reaching a max of approximately 40 percent in 2004. Overall, the foreign
component contributes about 16% to total dividend income which is about 12 percent
of income from property ownership. Also, there has been a lot of fluctuations in divi-
dend income since 1985. This can be mainly attributed to the fact that, U.S. economy
experienced several financial frictions since the 80’s. With the economic expansion of the
2000’s dividend income reached a max growth rate of about 29.98 in 2004. However, with
the Great Recession in 2007, it decreased by 31.11 percent between 2007 and 2010. See
Figure 10.
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4.2 Interest Income in the United States, 1950 - 2015
As defined by the BEA, it is the interest income from all sources, both monetary and
imputed, that is received by individuals, by private and government employee retirement
plans and by quasi-individuals. Monetary interest recevied by individuals and quasi-
individuals consists largely of interest that is reportable for federal individual income tax
- including nontaxable interest from municipal bonds - but it also includes the interest
received by nonprofit institutions, the interest retained by estates and trusts, and the in-
terest accrued on individual retirement accounts and other tax deffered savings accounts
in the year in which the interest is earned.21 Monetary interest received by private and
government employee retirement plans compromises interest received by private pension
plans, by the Federal Civilian employee retirement plans (including TFPs), by the mil-
itary retirement plan, and the state and local government employee retirement plans.22
Imputed interest income by persons consists of the investment that is received on behalf
of individuals by life insurance carriers and the imputed interest that is received by per-
sons from banks, credit agencies, and regulated investment companies, which represents
the value of financial services for which person are not explicitly charged. Interest income
is the second most significant component of income from property ownership. Over the
1950 - 2015 period, interest income accounted for 10.95 percent of total personal income
at the national level. See Table 5. This contribution is 6 percentage points higher than
the contribution by dividend income, and capital gains, whose share are 3.7 percent and













21For more details see www.bea.gov
22The BEA calculations indicates that, for each of the civilian categories, 60 percent of the interest
- the “currently employed” portion - is assumed ot be recived on behalf of current employees, and 40
percent - the “retired” portion - on behalf of retired persons and their survivors. For the military plan,
the “currently employed” portion is assumed to be 40 percent, and the “retired” portion is 60 percent
23The contribution of interest income to total personal income is greater than the contribution of



















































by persons of households
(6)
From 1950 to 2015 the rate of growth of income from interest has been approximately 8
percent. Before 1965, most of interest income in the U.S. was due to net interest paid
by the government which went from about 60 percent of total interest income in 1950
to about 40 percent in the early 1960’s and further falling to 30 percent in the early
1980’s. The share of interest income by the government has been persistently stable
after 1985, accounting for 34 percent admist fluctuations. See Figure 14. Even though
interest income by domestic businesses, owner-occupied housing, non-profit institutions
and the rest of the world contributed approximately 29 percent to total interest income
in the 1950’s, there’s been a drastic increase in it’s share over the years. It accounted
for 60 percent in 1980 and remain between 40 to 50 percent through the 90’s and 2000’s.
Currently, it is the most substantial contributor to interest income, averaging 48 percent
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Figure 12: Interest Income in the United States, 1949-2015
fairly stable over the years, fluctuating mainly between 10 and 20 percent of total interest
income. See Figure 14 for details on the components of interest income. Figure 12 shows
a structural break in the growth rate of interest income before and after 1985. Before
1985, the long-run growth rate of interest was approximately 11.9 percent, during which
we observe a significant increase in the share of interest income payments by businesses,
nonprofit institutions, foreign organization and the housing market.24. However, after
1985, there has been a drop in the growth rate of interest income to 2.9 percent. What
does this imply for wealth creation? Even though, the current growth in interest income
is much lower than it was in the 1950 - 1980 period, it is evident from the data that the
acquisition of private sector interest bearing assets creates more wealth than government
interest bearing assets and interest bearing assets by households. An alternative way of
measuring interest income, defined by the BEA, is given by
24There is an increase in the share of interest income payments by businesses, nonprofit institutions,
foreign organizations and the housing market to total interest income from 25 percent in 1950 to approx-
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where monetary interest received consists of interest that is reportable for federal indi-
vidual tax and imputed interest received consists of interest that is received on behalf
of individuals. Equation (7) reveals interest facts about the composition of interest in-
come from a different perspective. First and foremost, it shows that imputed interest
received by non-profit institutions account for almost zero percent of interest income.25
Until 1976, the share of interest received by non-profit institutions to interest income was
actually zero, and then averaged 0.099 percent after 1976. Secondly, monetary interest
received by persons has been persistently declining over the entire period: 55 percent of
interest income in 1950 to an average of 36 percent between 2010 and 2015. On the other
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Figure 15: Alternative Composition of Interest Income in the United States, 1949-1950
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hand, imputed interest received by persons has been persistently rising, and currently
accounting for more than 60 percent of interest income. This certainly enforces the role
of inherited wealth as imputed interest income by persons consists of investment that is
received on the behalf of others through life-insurance careers, and from banks, credit
agencies, and regulated investment companies.
4.3 Rental Income in the United States, 1950 - 2015
Rental income with capital consumptions adjustment as defined by the BEA, is the net
current-production income of persons from the rental of real property. It consists of net
income from the rental of tenant occupied housing by persons, the imputed net income
from the housing services of owner-occupied housing, and the royalty income of persons
from patents, copyrights, and the rights to natural resources. Rental income is divided
into monetary rental income and imputed rental income. Monetary rental income is
the net rents and royalties that are received by individuals and quasi-individuals, and
also net rents and royalties that are recived by private pension plans. Imputed rental
income consists of imputed net rents received by the owner-occupants of mobile homes
and imputed net rents received by owner-occupants of all other non-farm dwellings. See
[25] for more details. Rental income with capital consumption adjustment (unaltered
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Figure 16: Rental Income in the United States, 1949 - 2015
Rental income in the U.S. has been growing at 6 percent since 1950s as shown in
Figure 16. The rate of growth of income from rental has been equally due to both
rental income from private businesses and rental income from households and nonprofit
institutions as shown in Figure 17. Between 1950 and 1985 the share of rental income
from private businesses followed a U-shape pattern: decreasing from 55 percent of total













1949	 1953	 1957	 1961	 1965	 1969	 1973	 1977	 1981	 1985	 1989	 1993	 1997	 2001	 2005	 2009	 2013	
Private	businesses	and	Royal=es	 Households	and	nonprofit	ins=tu=ons	
Figure 17: Composition of Rental Income in the United States, 1949 - 2015
rise during the 1980’s was mainly due to the increase in income from royalties and tenant
occupied housing activitives. See Figure 18. Likeweise, during the same time there was a
significant decline in rental income from households, mainly because of decline in nonfarm
owner-occupied activities between 1984 and 1989. See Figure 19. During this period, the
sum of the components of rental income was less than 100 percent, mainly because income
from household were mainly in the negative. Since 1990, on the other hand, there has
been a gradual decline in the share of rental income by private businesses to about 30
percent between 2010 and 2015. During the same period, the growth in rental income
from household and nonprofit institutions also increased to about 70 percent. This can by
explain solely by the increase in household nonfarm owner-occupied housing since 1990,
which coincides with the rise in housing market activities the U.S. economy.
However, the BEA definition of rental income does not include data for persons en-
gages in the real estate business. That is, it does not include the net income from the
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Figure 18: Composition of Rental Income from Private Businesses and Royalties in the
United States, 1949-2015
of corporate profits, or the net income of tenant occupied housing by partnerships and
sole proprietorships, which is included in proprietors’ income. I provide an alternative
measure for rental income by including rental income of persons engaged in the real es-
tate business. Since Corporate profits are usually distributed in the form of dividends,
or interests, or reinvested in the company I do not include the portion tenant occupied
housing by corporations.26 Data on persons in the real estate business can be found in
NIPA table 7.2, line 9, Proprietors’ Income. Proprietors’ income, with inventory valua-
tion and capital consumption adjustments, is defined as the current-production income
of sole proprietorships and partnerships, and of tax-exempt coorporatives. Proprietors’
income is usually presented in two parts - nonfarm proprietors income which accounts for
more than 80 percents of proprietors’ income and then farm proprietors’ income. For my
26To compensate this problem I provide an alternative measure for income from property ownership
which includes undistributed corporate profits. This accounts for real estate businesses owned by corpo-
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Figure 19: Composition of Rental Income from Households and Non-Profit Institutions
in the United States, 1949-2015
analysis, I use rental income adjusted for persons engaged in the real estate businesses.27















By including proprietors income into rental income, the long-run growth rate of income
from rental remains at 6 percent per annum since 1950. See Figure 20. This growth
rate is the same as the unadjusted rental income defined by the BEA. However, it is
evident from Figure 21 that the contribution of households, non-profit institutions, private
businesses and royalties, is trumped by the contribution of persons engaged in the real
estate business. Over the entire period, proprietors’ income accounts for more than 80
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Figure 21: Composition of Adjusted Rental Income in the United States, 1949 - 2015
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percent of rental income reaching heights of approximately 93 percent between 1986
and 1990. Nonetheless, after the 2007 financial crises in the U.S., its contribution has
substantially reduced to approximately 70 percent between 2009 and 2015. During the
same period, there has been a spike in rental income from household and non-profit
instituion. It is important to highlight the role played by real estate businesses, as
acquiring property significanly leads to wealth creation, and we see that it is corporations
that benefit more from the acquisition of property.
4.4 Capital Gains in the United States, 1950 - 2015
Realized capital gains data are not readily available from BEA sources, so then I obtain
the series on realized capital gains by splicing data from the U.S. Department of Treasury,
Office of Tax Analysis for the years 1954 to 2009 and from the Congressional Budget Office
for the years 1995 to 2013.[27, 28] The CBO data for 2014 to 2015 are projected values
and data for 1950 to 1953 are estimated values based on the long-run growth from 1954
to 2013 . See Table 6 and Table 7.28 Captial gains have increasingly become an integral
part of income in the U.S. even though it is not included in the National Income and
Product Accounts. Between 1950 and 2015, realized capital gains were about 3.6 percent
of National income. This share gradually increased over the years, reaching heights of
8.8 and 7.7 percent of national income in 1986, and right before the Great recession of
2007, respectively. The contribution of realized gains cannot be ignored when observing
income from property ownership. See Table 5.
In the United states, individuals and corporations are both subject to U.S. federal
taxes on the net of their capital gains just as they are subject income tax. Particulary,
short-term capital gains - which are gains on assets held for a year or less before being
sold - are taxed at the same rate as income tax, and long-term capital gains - which are
gains on the sale of assets held for more than one year - are generally taxed at a more
favorable rate than the income tax rates. [11] According to the Internal Revenue Services
(IRS) the current (2015) tax rate on most net capital gain is no higher than 15% for
28To get data for the years 1950 to 1953, I extrapolated the long run values for captial gains based on
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Figure 22: Realized Capital Gains in the United States, 1950 - 2015
most taxpayers. Some or all net capital gains are taxed at 0% for individuals that fall
within the 10% - 15% ordinary income tax bracket; 15% for individuals within the 25%
- 35% income tax bracket; and 20% for the 39.6% income tax bracket. See Table 8. The
gains tax is mainly dependent on the investors tax bracket and the amount of time the
investment was held before being sold. However, there are few exceptions where capital
gains may be taxed at rates greater than 15%. These include: the taxable part of a
gain from selling qualified small business stock which is taxed at a maximum 28%, net
capital gains from selling collectibles (coins, art etc.) which are taxed at a maximum
25%, and the portion of any unrecaptured gain from selling real property is taxed at a
maximum 25%. On the other hand, under the ”step up in basis” rule in the federal tax
code, capital gains are taxed at 0% in case of death. Also, for an individual who inherits
stock or property and later sells it, the stock/property is subject to capital gains tax on
the difference between what the stock or property was sold for and what the stock was
worth when it was inheritted. That is, there is no capital gains tax from when the stock
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or property was purchased to when it was inheritted. Inherently, it shows that property
is not taxed when inherited even though it might have appreciated in value and generated
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Figure 23: Growth Rate of Income from Realized Capital Gains in the United States,
1950 - 2015
To highlight the importance of capital gains in the United States, emphasis must be
placed on the history of marginal tax rates on gains, and how it affects the investors
income, especially after the world wars. During 1921, the United States District Court
of Connecticut ruled that an appreciation in capital assets, inasmuch as it was merely
an increase in capital rather than income, was not taxable as income under the federal
income tax ammendment.29[14] This decision was in conformity with British practice.
However, the supreme court soon reversed the decision of the Connecticut court, and the
Revenue Act of 1921, introduced by the Harding Administration, recognized and defined
the difference between ”capital gains” and ”ordinary net income.” The new law provided
29Walsh vs. Brewster, 268 Fed. 207
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that captital net gains of individuals may be taxeded at 12.5 percent instead of at the
higher surtax rates which are applicable to ordinary net income that reach the higher
tax brackets, provided that any one who elects to have his capital gains taxed at 12.5
percent shall in no case pay less than 12.5 percent upon his entire net income. This
limitation on the taxation of capital gains was of no benefit to individual having a net
income less than $31,000, for such a person would have to pay less than an average 12.5
percent on his/her income [9]. From 1934 to 1941, tax payers could exclude a percentage
of their capital gains which mainly varied with the length of their holding period. That
is, taxpayers could exclude 20, 40, 60 and 70 percent of their gains from taxes if their
assets were held for 1, 2, 5 and 10 years respectively [11]. The tax breaks created the
incentive for investors to delay realizing their gains. Beginning 1940’s, more incentives
were given to asset holders as taxpayers could exclude 50 percent of capital gains on assets
held for shorter periods, at least six months, or they could elect a 25 percent alternative
tax rate if their ordinary tax rate exceeded 50 percent [11]. The incentive to long-term
captial gains were drastically reduced in the 1969 Tax Reform and 1976 Tax Reform.
The 1969 Tax Refor Act under the Nixon administration, indicated that the alternative
tax on long-term capital gains gives an incentive for high income taxpayers to convert
their income into capital gains in order to receive lesser rates because the alternative
rates decreases their effective tax rate by more than one-half. To solve the solution,
the 1969 act eliminated the 6 months holding period deduction, imposed a 10 percent
minimum tax, and limited the alternative tax to $50,000 of gains. The 1976 act further
increased the capital gains tax rates by increasing the minimum tax rate to 15 percent.
By 1977 and 1978, the maximum tax rate on capital gains had reached 39.875 percent
with the minimum tax and 49.875 percent including an interation with the maximum
tax. [11, 43, 26] The 1980’s were accompanied with capital gain tax reductions. In 1981
there were tax rate reductions on capital gains to a maximum of 20 percent on long-term
gains. However, these reductions did not last long as the 1986 Tax Reform Act repealed
the exclusion of long-term gains and raised the maximum rate to 28 percent (33 percent
for taxpayers subject to certain phaseouts). Top ordinary tax rates were increased by the
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1990 and 1993 budget acts and an alternative 28 percent capital gains tax was introduced.
However, the effective tax rate exceeded 28 percent for many high-income taxpayers so
then in 1997 new lower rate reductions for 18-month and 5-year assets were adopted. [11]
See Table 6 and Table 7 for Nominal and Effective tax rates for the period 1954 to 2014.
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, imposed imposed a 20% maximum tax rate on
assets held for more than 18 month before sale. This Relief Act substantially changed
the taxation of capital gains on principal residence. It included a one-time exclusion of
up to $125,00 of capital gains for taxpayers age 55 and over, and the rollover of capital
gains from one resident to another, were replaced with an exclusion of up to $500,000
($250,000 for nonjoint returns). [11] The issue of taxes with realized capital gains has
raised criticism as very little federal tax revenue is generated. Nonetheless, since 1997
the maximum tax rate on long-term gains has averaged 20 percent. This is 18 percentage
points lower than the income tax bracket imposed on the wealthy. It is evident then that
by converting income payment to capita gains, the wealthy are able to substantially lower
their taxes. 30.
During the period 1950 to 2015, the long-run growth rate of income from realized
capital gains was approximately 7.8 percent. Like the other components of income from
property ownership, this is 5.8 percentage points higher than the long-run growth rate
in income per capita in the U.S. economy. It is important to note that the data used is
only on realized capital gains. Unrealized gains certainly create wealth when asset prices
appreciate in value. However, due to the lack of data on unrealized capital gains, it is
excluded from my analysis.
30This does not include the fact tax payers can exclude almost up to 80 percent of their gains from
taxes
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5 Models of Wealth Concentration
5.1 The Piketty Model of wealth Accumulation
I employ the Piketty dynamic wealth-accumulation model with random idiosyncratic
shocks [38], where I make the assumption that the return on capital (r) as defined in
the model is well captured by the rate of return on property ownership (rp). I consider
a dynamic economy with a discrete set of generations 0, 1, ..., t, .... The model can be
interpreted as an annual model, with each period lasting T=1 year, or a generational
model with each period T=30 years, in which case the savings taste can be interpreted
as bequest taste. Assuming a stationary population, Nt = [0, 1], made of a continuum of
agents of size one, aggregate variables and average variables are the same for wealth and
national income. That is Wt = wt and Yt = yt. I also assume that effective labor supply
Lt = Nt · ht = h0 · (1 + g)t grows at an exogenous rate g. Domestic output, Ytd, is given
by the CES production function












Let’s assume that each individual i ∈ [0, 1] receives labor income yLt,i = yLt and has
some annual rate of return rpt,i = rpt. Each agent chooses cti and wt+1,i to maximize
their utility function with wealth taste parameter, sti, given by the Cobb-Douglass utility
function
U (cti, wti) = c1−stiti wstiti (13)
and subject to the budget constraint
cti + wt+1,i ≤ yLt + (1 + rpt)wti (14)
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Random shocks are introduced into the model only in the form of idiosyncratic variations
in the savings taste parameter, sti, which is drawn from an iid random process with mean
s = E(sti) < 1. Intuitively, s cannot equal one, because people who save all their income
and returns from wealth are left with nothing to consume. Utility maximization implies
that
cti = (1− sti)
[
yLt + (1 + rpt)wti
]
(15)
which indicates that individuals consume a fraction of their total resources, both labor
income and wealth, available at time t. By substituting equation (15) into equation (14)
(the budget constraint), we have that
wt+1,i = sti
[
yLt + (1 + rpt)wti
]
(16)
which gives us the individual transition equation for wealth. At the aggregate level






Since we are interested in the wealth to income ratio, let’s divide equation (16) by yt+1 ≈












By denoting the capital share as αt = rptβt, and the labor share as 1−αt = yLtyt , and that
the wealth-income ratio at time t is equal to βt, by rearranging (18) this results in the
31We also take that the aggregate variables and average variables are the same for wealth and national
incomehence.
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1 + g +
1 + rpt
1 + g βt
]
(19)
In an open economy case, rpt = rp and from equation (19), it is obvious that βt converges
towards a finite limit β if and only if
ω = s · 1 + rp1 + g < 1 (20)
If ω > 1 then βt keeps increasing from generation to generation, and βt converges to
infinity (∞). In the long-run, the economy is no longer a small open economy and ”rp”
will have to fall so that ω < 1. This explains the fact that individuals cannot accumulate
wealth forever. If βt < βt+1 < βt+2 < ... then eventually, rp will fall until ω < 1 at
which βt converges. On the other hand, βt always converges, in a closed economy case,
towards a finite limit. In the long-run, the rate of return on capital is equal to the
marginal product of capital, and depends negatively upon β and is determined by the
CES production function. However since the rate of return on capital is captured by the
rate of return on property ownership, then rp = Fk = αβ−1/σ. The steady-state level of
wealth-income ratio implies that βt+1 = βt. By substituting this in equation (17) and
dividing through by yt+1 you obtain the steady-state wealth income ratio:
βt → β =
s




where s̃ = s(1 +β)−β is the steady state savings rate expressed as a fraction of national
income. Taking that normalized individual wealth (zti) is equal to wti/wt, and by dividing
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1− s1 + rp1 + g + s
1 + rp
1 + g zti
]
(23)






(1− ω) + ω · zti
]
(24)
Following the work of Piketty and Zucman [38], let’s assume a simple 2 dimensional
inequality model with Binomial Random Tastes, where the role played by taste in the
model takes only two values. The shocks could come from taste or other factors such
as in the primogeniture model of Stiglitz [41], or from the rates of return as seen in the
models of Benhabib et al. [7, 8] and Nerei [24].32 That is
si =

s0 with probability1− p
s1 with probabilityp
Then the aggregate savings rate in the economy is given by
s = E(si) = ps1
Given the transition equation for wealth and assuming that ω < 1 < ω∗ = ω/p, if
si = s0 = 0, then zt+1,i = 0 with probability 1 − p, and if si = s1 > 0, then zt+1,i =
s1
s




32From Piketty [38] this is applicable to models with multiplicative random shocks in the wealth
accumulation process, whether shocks are binomial or multinomial, and whether the shocks come from
tastes or other factors.
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steady-state wealth distribution, φ(z), is discrete and given by
z = z0 = 0 with probability 1− p











with probability (1− p)p





















with probability (1− p)p2
...








































with probability(1− p)pk (25)
Note that as k →∞, zk ≈ 1−ωω−p · (
ω
p
). Also, assuming that ω
p
< 1, then (ω
p
)k − 1 becomes
negative for any k and hence zk = 1−ωp−ω [1 − (
ω
p
)k] which has a finite upper bound 1−ω
p−ω as
k →∞.
The cummulated distribution of wealth is given by







as z → +∞, this implies that








where λ = 1−ω
ω−p is a constant term and a =
log(1/p)
log(ω/p) is the pareto coefficient. The inverted
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Pareto coefficient (the ratio of average wealth z∗ of individuals with wealth above z to z)








) > 1 (29)
For a given probability p, as ω → 1, the pareto coefficient a = log(1/p)
log(ω/p) → 1 and b→ +∞,
which implies infinite wealth inequality. That is, an increase in ω = s1+rp1+g implies a larger
wealth reproduction rate ω∗ for wealth holders, which provides a stronger amplification
of inequality. Likewise, as ω → p, the pareto coefficient a→ +∞ and the inverser pareto
coefficient b → 1 which implies zero wealth inequality. On the other hand, for a given
level of ω, as p→ 0, a→ 1 and b→ +∞, implying that a small fraction of the population
gets an infinitely large stock of wealth. Conversely, as p→ ω, ato+∞, and b→ 1 which
implies that the long run level on inequality approaches zero. This inherently shows that
the inequality of wealth is an increasing function of rp and g
5.2 Simulating the Piketty Model of Wealth Accumulation
By simulating a simple model for the United States economy over the 1950 - 2015 period,
the dynamics of the wealth inequality profile can be produced in comparison to the
findings by Piketty [34] (Chapter 10). If we assume each period to be a discrete-time
model as shown above as lasting H years (with H=30 years = generation length), and if
rp and g denote instantaneous rates, then ω can be written as
ω = s · 1 +Rp1 +G = s · e
(rp−g)·H (30)
with 1 + Rp = erp·H the generational rate of return on property and 1 + G = eg·H
the generational growth rate. Simulating the model for the entire period post World
Wars, rp = 7.17% and g = 2.06%. So then the gap rp − g equals 5.09% for the United
States economy. With a savings rate, s = 8.65% and H = 65 years, this implies that
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ω = s · e(rp−g)·H = 2.489.33 See Table 2 for results. I find that ω > 1, which implies
that wealth inequality is explosive in the U.S. economy. This also implies that there is
no existence of a long run level of wealth concentration hence overtime ω would have
to fall such that ω < 1. Assuming the same estimates for growth in income per capita
and savings rate, the level of rp necessary for there to be a stable equilibrium wealth
inequality in the U.S. economy, rp has to be less than 5.83%. This corresponds to a
maximum r − g gap of 3.77%. By assuming that rp = 5, equivalent to the long run rate
of return on capital suggested by Piketty [33], for a given binomial shock structure with
p = 10%, ω = 0.6080, the pareto coefficient a = equals 1.2757, and the inverse pareto
coefficient b equals 4.627. This estimate corresponds to an economy with high wealth
inequality where the top 1 percent wealth share is around 50-60 percent. Significantly
higher than the estimates of wealth inequality suggested by Piketty. Table 1 shows the
estimates of the pareto coefficients (a) and the inverse pareto coefficients (b) over the
decades. Table 2 shows the estimates over a 30-year period and for the entire 1950-2015
period. Both Table 1 and Table 2 assume that the probability of a wealth distribution
shock (p) occuring is 0.1 (10 percent). For Table 3, I simulate the model assuming that
the probability of a shock occuring is 0.0015 (0.15 percent).
33I assume a savings rate equal to the United States personal savings rate expressed as a percentage
of disposable income (NIPA Table 2.1) over the period 1950 - 2014.
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Time s rp g ω = s · eH·(rp−g) a = log(1/p)log(ω/p) b =
a
a−1
1950-1959 0.1063 0.0632 0.0248 0.156 5.18 1.24
1960-1969 0.1113 0.0666 0.0312 0.1586 4.99 1.25
1970-1979 0.1183 0.1002 0.0217 0.0929 negative -
1980-1989 0.0931 0.0987 0.0218 0.2009 3.3 1.43
1990-1999 0.0672 0.0657 0.0199 0.1062 38 1.03
2000-2009 0.0426 0.0246 0.0085 0.05 negative -
2010-2015 0.0567 0.0646 0.0133 0.0947 negative -
Calculations by Author. The probability of a shock occuring in the United States economy (p) is set to 0.1













Time s rp g ω = s · eH·(rp−g) a = log(1/p)log(ω/p) b =
a
a−1
1956-1985 0.1119 0.084 0.0234 0.689 1.196 6.102
1986-2015 0.0583 0.0484 0.0156 0.156 5.181 1.239
1950-2015 0.0865 0.0715 0.0206 2.489 - -
Calculations by Author. The probability of a shock occuring in the United States economy (p) is set to 0.1
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Time s rp g ω = s · eH·(rp−g) a = log(1/p)log(ω/p) b =
a
a−1
1950-1959 0.1063 0.0632 0.0248 0.156 1.40 3.5
1960-1969 0.1113 0.0666 0.0312 0.1586 1.39 3.56
1970-1979 0.1183 0.1002 0.0217 0.0929 1.58 2.72
1980-1989 0.0931 0.0987 0.0218 0.2009 1.33 4.03
1990-1999 0.0672 0.0657 0.0199 0.1062 1.52 2.92
2000-2009 0.0426 0.0246 0.0085 0.05 1.86 2.16
2010-2015 0.0567 0.0646 0.0133 0.0947 1.57 2.75
1956-1985 0.1119 0.084 0.0234 0.689 1.06 17.67
1986-2015 0.0583 0.0484 0.0156 0.156 1.40 3.5
1950-2015 0.0865 0.0715 0.0206 2.489 - -
Calculations by Author. The probability of a shock occuring in the United States economy (p) is set to 0.0015.
The main findings of this paper is that, the Piketty Random Shock model does not explain
wealth inequality in the United States when considering the return on property ownership.
This is mainly due to the restrictions that are placed on the model: ω = s · 1+rp1+g < 1 and
ω < p. These conditions are necessary for an equilibrium level of wealth inequality to
exist. Intuitively, people don’t decide to accumulate wealth because of these conditions.
The results shown in Table 1 indicate that the inverse pareto coefficient (b) ranges between
1.0 and 1.5. This shows that the U.S. economy is an extremely egalitarian society with
the top 1 percent owning between 0 to 10 percent of the nations wealth. For certain
decades, 1970-1979, 2000-2009, and 2010-2015, ω < p resulting in a negative pareto
coefficient.34 Since a must alway be greater than zero, there cannot exist an equilibrium
level of wealth inequality when a < 0. The reason why Piketty [33] suggests that the
34Calculation are made given a binomial shock structure p = 0.1. This is what is used in Piketty and
Zucman [38].
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U.S. economy hasn’t reached levels of wealth inequality previously experienced by most
European economies before the World Wars is because, enough time hasn’t elapsed for
wealth to be accumulated. Perhaps, this is true and evident when simulating the dynamic
wealth-accumulation model with random idiosyncratic shocks over decades. That is, the
long run effect of rp−g on wealth is not made evident within the decade. Next, I evaluate
the model over 30 year periods and over the entire period of study, 1950 to 2015. See
table 2 for results.
There are two main contradictions from simulating the longer period effect of rp−g on
wealth inequality, assuming a probability shock of 10 percent (p = 0.1). First, between
1956 and 1985, a = 1.196 and b = 6.102 which implies a level of wealth inequality where
the top 1 percent own approximately 70 - 80 percent of total wealth in the U.S. economy.
However, we that that from 1986 to 2015, there is a decline in the level of wealth inequality
in the U.S. economy. That is, the inverse pareto coefficient, b, is equal to 1.239 which is
equivalent to an economy where the top 1 percent own approximately 5 percent of total
wealth. This contradicts Piketty’s [33] findings as wealth inequality after the World Wars
has been gradually rising. By taking the average of the two wealth inequality estimates
over the two periods, we get an estimate close to Piketty’s prediction of wealth inequality
in the U.S. economy, where the top 1 percent own about 40 percent of wealth. The second
contradiction comes by ways of estimating the model over the entire period, 1950 - 2015.
From Table 2 we see that ω = s · e(rp−g)·H = 2.489. If ω is greater than 1, then we have
explosive inequality. Therefore, based on the model, there is explosive wealth inequality
in the U.S. economy. The level of rp−g, given the estimate for s in the U.S. economy over
the 66 year period, needed to ensure that there exists an equilibrium level of inequality
(ω < 1) implies that rp − g < 0.037 (3.7 percent). Piketty [33] assuming an r − g gap of
3 percent certainly ensures that an equilibrium level does exist. However, by looking at
income from property ownership we see that inequality is explosive in the U.S. economy.
To ensure a level of inequality where the top 1 percent own approximately 35 percent
of wealth as in Piketty [36, 37], where the pareto coefficient (b) is equal to 3.5, this
implies that, the probability of a binomial random shock occurring has to equal 0.0015
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(0.15 percent).35 This implies that the probability of a shock occuring, whether from
taste, primogeniture, the number of children, or from the rates of return, which Piketty
[33] mentions, has been practically non-existent since the 1950’s. Table 3 shows the
results for the simulated model for decades, starting from the 1950s, for 30 year periods,
and for the entire period assuming that p = 0.0015.
5.3 A Simple Model of Wealth Accumulation
A lot of ideology went into the design and display of the U.S. National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA). The NIPA propagates the notion that national income is identical to
the production of goods and services. Hence, the only way of generating income is through
the production of goods and services valued by the people. Likewise, it also corroborates
the notion that wealth is built through production, which is in line with Piketty’s claim
that all capital is used in the production process only. However, as shown in section
2.3 wealth can be created without the production of goods and services taking place.
The central role of Piketty’s r− g in generating wealth has given rise to some confusion.
According to Jones [15], This confusion is rooted in the fact that, the relationship between
Piketty’s r − g and wealth inequality is not obviously clear in the Neoclassical Growth
model. Jones [15] indicates that the relationship between r − g and inequality is much
more easily appreciated in models that explicitly generate pareto wealth inequality. The
key link between the data and the theory is the pareto distribution.
In this section, I examine a simple model of wealth accumulation that gives rise to
Pareto Distribution, and considers the economic forces that influence top inequality over
time for the U.S. economy. Pareto inequality is generated through a mechanism that is
characterized by the power law: an exponential growth that occurs over an exponentially
distributed amount of time results in a pareto distribution.36 My contribution here is that
I introduce the rate of return on property ownership into the model.
35Calculation are made with the assumption that aa−1 = 3.5 hence a = 1.4, and the current estimates
of the savings rate (s), the rate of return on property ownership (rp), and the growth rate of GDP per
capita (g) in the U.S. economy.
36The defining characteristic of a Pareto Distribution is Pr[x > y] = y−
1
η , which implies that the
probability that x is greater than y is proportional to y raised to some power. See Pareto [29]
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Following the work of Jones [15], let’s assume an economy with heterogenous people,
there is no labor income, individuals consume a constant fraction α of their wealth, wealth
is subject to tax, τ , and that the average wealth per person (capital per person) grows
at an exogenous rate g. So then, let a denonte an individuals wealth which accumulates
over time according to
ȧ = rpa− τa− c (31)
where rp is the rate of return on property ownnership (assets), τ is a wealth tax rate, and
c is the individuals consumption.37 Assuming that consumption is a constant fraction of
wealth α, then
ȧ = (rp − τ − α) · a (32)
which is the law of motion for wealth accumulation. The wealth of an individual of age
x at date t is then given by
at(x) = at−x(0) · e(rp−τ−α)·x (33)
where at−x(0) is the initial wealth of a new born at date t − x. Note that capital is not
equal to property. That is, the exponential growth of wealth is fundamentally affected by
the return on property ownership, rp. Therefore, in the asset accumulation equation, the
return on property ownership is the key determinant of an individuals wealth. To obtain
a variable that exhibits a stationary distribution, the individual’s wealth is normalized
by average wealth per person or income per person in the economy.
Same as Jones [15], I introduce heterogeneity into the model through a birth-death
process, where each new born in the economy inherits the same amount of wealth, and
the aggregate inherittance is simply equal to the aggregate wealth of the people who die
each period. The number of people born at date t is give by
Bt = B0en̄t (34)
37Other models that promote a simple model of wealth accumulation include Wold and Whittle [46],
Stiglitz [41], Quadrini [39], Benhabib and Bisin [7], Nirei [24], Moll [22], and Piketty and Zucman [33]
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Death follows a poisson process with the arrival rate d̄. Hence the stationary distribution
of the birth-death process is an exponential process, given by
Pr[Age > x] = e−(n̄+d̄)x (35)
See Appendix B for more details.
The model can be analyzed in either a general equilibrium framework or in a partial
equilibrium framework.38 For comparison with the Piketty model, I focus on a partial
equilibrium model. The ideal with wealth distribution in a partial equilibrium framework






where ā ≡ d̄
n̄+d̄ and kt ≡
Kt
Nt
is capital per person in the economy.39 Even though I
am using capital in the model, the assumption is that capital is not equal to wealth. If
an economy is in a steady state, then the capital per person grows at a constant and
exogenous rate, g, over time. That is
kt = k0egt (37)
The assumption here is that the growth of income per person determines the initial wealth
of a person, therefore the amount of wealth that a person of age x at date t inherited
when they were born at date t− x is given by
at−x(0) = ākt−x = ākte−gx (38)
38Note that in a partial equilbrium model, the growth rate of normalized wealth is rp − g − τ − α. In
a general equilibrium model, the key source of heterogeneity is population growth. Newborns in such an
economy inherit wealth of the people who die. However, since there are more newborns than people who
die, newborns inherit less than the average amount of wealth per capita.
39d̄Kt equals the aggreate wealth of the people who die, and (n̄ + d̄)Nt is the number of new borns.
Because of population growth, new borns inherit less than the average amount of capital per person in
the economy, and this fraction is ā.
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Substituting this into the equation for wealth accumulation, we get that
at(x) = ākte(rp−g−τ−α)x (39)
The above equation is the exponential growth process that is central to the pareto dis-
tribution of normalized wealth, and it is obvious that rp − g plays an important role as
shown by Piketty [33]. However, another process central to the process is the exponential
age distribution (population growth) providing heterogeneity in the model. We now have
an exponential growth process occuring over an exponentially distributed amount of time.
By inverting at(x) we have that
x(a) = 1




which gives the age at which a person achieves wealth a. The wealth distribution is then
given by









Since the pareto inequality is measured by the inverse of the exponent, we get a steady
state distribution that is pareto wealth, such that
ηwealth =
rp − g − τ − α
n̄+ d̄
(42)
The above equation is at the basis of wealth creation and emphasises the Piketty r − g
relation as well. Note that as the gap rp− g increases so does wealth inequality, all other
things being equal. Likewise, a lower wealth tax will increase wealth inequality and vice
versa. It is also very important to address n̄ + d̄ in the pareto wealth equation. In a
society where n̄+ d̄ is low either because of a decine in birth rate(n̄) or a decline in death
rate (d̄) - people who are part of a long lived dynasty - greater stocks of wealth will be
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accumulated. So then, low population growth will aid wealth creation by minimizing the
distribution of wealth leading to high inequality and vice versa.
5.4 Simulating the Simple Model of Wealth Accumulation
Simulationg the simple model of wealth accumulation for the United States economy over
the period 1950 - 2015, I compare the results to the model in section 5.1 and 5.2, and
also to the findings by Piketty [33]. The analysis is based on the simple pareto wealth
accumulation, where
ηwealth =
rp − g − τ − α
n̄+ d̄
(43)
I simulate the model for the entire period post World Wars where rp = 7.17% and
g = 2.06%, implying that the long-run gap between rp and g is 5.09%. I also simulate the
model over 30-year periods, starting 1956, and over 10-year periods starting in 1950. The
results are show in Table 4, Figure 24 and Figure 25. In column (1) of Table 4, I evaluate
the model based on the criteria that, data for income from property ownership already
accounts for taxes, consumption and depreciation. However, in columns (2) and (3), I
evaluate the model considering different tax growth rates (progressive taxes). Based on
the Pareto wealth inequality (Inverse pareto coefficient), three (3) main facts are evident:
First and foremost, After the World Wars, wealth inequality starts rising as suggested
by Piketty [33]. In the 1950’s, it is observed that the average wealthy individual owns
approximately 3.6 times as much wealth as the average person. An increase is observed
through the 1960’s and 1970’s until the 1980’s where the average wealthy individual owns
approximately 10 times as much wealth as the average individual in the U.S. economy.
This pattern is also observed when different levels of tax growth rates are examined.
Nonetheless, the level of inequality throughout this period far exceeds the level suggested
by Piketty. Based on the the results in column (1) of Table 4, it is observed that the top
1 percent own approximately 35 percent of wealth in the 1950’s. This rise in inequality
rises until the 1980’s where the top 1 percent own about 90 percent of wealth in the
economy. When the model is evaluated assuming higher levels of tax growth rates, I find
that from 1950 to the 1980’s, the top 1 percent go from owning between 30 percent and
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25 percent to owning between 80 and 70 percent of wealth respectively. This is shown in
columns (2) and (3) of Table 4.














1950-1959 6.32 1.73 3.65 3.07 2.49
1960-1969 6.66 1.36 4.90 4.16 3.43
1970-1979 10.02 1.05 9.53 8.58 7.62
1980-1989 9.87 0.95 10.41 9.35 8.30
1990-1999 6.57 1.22 5.38 4.56 3.74
2000-2009 2.46 0.96 2.57 1.53 0.48
2010-2015 6.46 0.74 8.71 7.36 6.01
1956-1985 8.67 1.23 7.05 6.24 5.42
1986-2015 5.20 1.00 5.22 4.21 3.21
1950-2015 7.17 1.17 6.13 5.28 4.42
Calculations by Author.
Secondly, in the 1990’s and 2000’s, I observe a drastic decline in wealth inequality to
where the average wealthy individual owns only approximately 2.5 times more than the
average individual in the economy. In the model where different tax rates are observed,
the decline is as low as the average wealthy individual owning the same amount of wealth
as the average individual. See column (2) and (3). The drop in wealth inequality is
evident with the technology boom in the 1990 and the recessions in the 2000’s. Basically,
with the technology boom of the 1990’s, different channels were present for individuals
to attain property though copyrights and patents, which had nothing to do with physical
property. Likewise, during the 2000’s, the great recession led to a loss of value in housing
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prices which could have translated to a loss in wealth for many. Not only that, but the
stock market crush also led to a loss of wealth for many. Third but not the least, after
2010, I observe that inequality is getting back to the level where the average wealthy
individual owned 10 times more wealth than the average individual. Based on the model
simulation, after 2010 the average wealthy individual owned 6 times more than the average
individual in the U.S. economy which corresponds to the top 1 percent owning more than
50 percent of wealth in the economy.
When the model is evalutate over 30 year periods, we see that wealth inequality
remains high after the World Wars with the average wealthy individual owning 7 times
more wealth than the average individual. there is a slight drop in the pareto wealth
inequality coefficient after 1985. However, it still remains high with the average wealthy
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Figure 25: Estimated Inverse Pareto Coefficients, 30-Year Periods, 1950-2015
6 Conclusion
Antonio [2], on his review of Piketty’s work states that, ”Piketty’s rentier thesis taps
public fears that the new normal of declining opportunity, mobility, fairness, and polit-
ical efficacy is here to stay. The impressive array of comparative data that he deloys
to make his case illuminates the enormous scale of economic inequality, radical rupture
from the postwar Trent Glorieuses, and prospect of a much more more unequal, undemo-
cratic future, should divergence continue unopposed.” Many are sceptical to the findings
that wealth inequality in developed economies is rising, which contradicts the popular
equitable portrayal of these economies politically. Nonetheless, the evidence cannot be
refuted that there is growing concerns of inequality in our society, which needs to ad-
dressed by researchers. My thesis, adds to the literature by specifically addressing wealth
inequality, and by focusing on property ownership. For the first part of the thesis, I use
after tax historical data from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts to derive
income from property ownership, and show that the level of wealth inequality in the U.S.
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economy is much higher than suggested in the Piketty literature. I find that when you
account for property ownership, the inequality gap rp − g is wider than Piketty’s r − g,
which has significant implications for wealth concentration. In the second and third sec-
tions of thesis, I implement the rp− g gap into different models of wealth inequality: the
Piketty model, and a simple model of wealth accumulation. The Piketty model assumes
that wealth is created through production, where as the latter model accounts specifically
for wealth creation without using the Neo-Classical Growth framework.
In the Piketty model, I find that there is no convergence of wealth inequality over the
entire period, when you account for income from property ownership. That is, inequality
is explosive in the U.S. economy. The model is highly dependent on fact that omega,
the difference between the exponential growth between the return on property ownership
and growth in income per capita, over time has to be less than 1. That is, ω = s · 1+Rp1+G =
s.e(rp−g)·H < 1. Nonetheless, when ω > 1 this implies that wealth inequality is explosive.
Surprisingly, evaluating the model over shorter periods, 10 years, reveals that wealth
ownership has been more equitable in the U.S. economy. Certainly, this contradicts the
fact that when evaluated over the entire period, wealth is explosive. The varying results
can be attributed to the fact that wealth accumulates over time. However, because
the Piketty model emphasizes on wealth creation based on production, inconsistencies
are created when wealth created without production is accounted for. That is, wealth
creation cannot be restricted by the fact that ω has to be less than 1. To replicate the
economy described by Piketty, I had to evaluate the model, with the assumption that
the probability of a shock affecting wealth accumulation is 0.015. I found that, wealth
inequality declined when the model was evaluated over two 30 year period: 1954-1985 and
1986-2015. However, even with a low probability of a disrutive shock occuring, wealth
inequality is explosive over the entire period.
Nonetheless, the main problem with the Piketty model is that it rooted in the Neo-
Classical Growth framework. That is, wealth must be created through production. As
indicated by Jones [15], the confusion with the central role of Piketty’s r− g is that, the
relationship between r − g and wealth inequality is not obviously clear in the Neoclassi-
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cal Growth model. I use as simple model of wealth accumulation for the U.S. economy,
accounting for income from property ownership. 3 main facts are obvious. (i) After the
World wars, there is a spike in wealth inequality in the U.S. economy, reaching a peak in
the 1980’s were the average wealthy individual owns 10 times as much wealth as the aver-
age person. (ii) There is a decline in wealth inequality in the 1990’s and 2000’s, however
an inclease in wealth in equality is observed again after 2010. (iii) Overall, the level of
wealth inequality found in the simple model of wealth accumulation is much higher than
levels found in the Piketty literature. I find that with rp − g = 5%, the top 1 percent of
wealth owners, own approximately 50 percent of wealth in the economy.
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A Defining Income From Property Ownership
I provide three (3) main definitions of income from property ownership. According to
the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), by the Bureau of Economic Analysis













This definition captures interest, dividend, and rental income regardless of whether it is
household capital income, corporate income or non-corporate business income. This defi-
nition is the basis for the other definitions. The second definition is a modified version of
the BEA definition to incorporate realized capital gains (or losses) which has increasingly
become an important part of the U.S. economy. I define income from property ownership
















In equaltion (46) I address the concerns of rental income as measured by the NIPA tables.
Rental income is defined as the net income of persons from the rental of property (rental
of tenant-occupied housing, imputed net income from the housing services of owner-
occupied housing, royalties, patents, copyrights, and rights to natural resources), but
does not include net income from the rental of tenant-occupied housing by corporations
(which is included in corporate profits) or by partnerships and sole proprietors (which is
included in proprietors’ income). I modifify the definition of rental income to include net
income from the rental of tenant-occupied housing by corporations, and by partnerships
and sole-proprietors.40 This definition is provided below and becomes the main equation
for my analysis and comparision.


















By defining income from property ownership as in equations (44), (45) and (46), I obtain
a long run rate of return on property ownership, r̂p, that serves as an alternative estimate
to the return on capital that best captures profits, rents, dividends, interest, royalties and
capital gains expressed as a percentage of the value of capital invested. For the period
1950 to 2015, after the World Wars, income from property ownership as defined by the
BEA accounted for 17 percent of National Income. Accounting for capital gains and
rental income by tenant-occupied housing, income from property ownership accounted
for 20 percent and 30 percent of total personal income at the national level, respectively.
Equation (46) provides a more comprehensive definition of income from property owner-
ship, therefore my following analyis focuses it. The contibution of income from property
ownership is significantly higher in more recent years: From 1950 to 1984, it accounted
for 29 percent of national income. Nonetheless, it accounted for 32 percent from 1985
to 2015, even though the latter period experienced more volatility. See the summary
statistics in Table 5.41
B Heterogeneity through a birth-death process
The birth-death process here follows the demography literature. The number of people
born at date t is given by
Bt = B0en̄t (47)
Death is a Poisson process with arrival rate d̄. To find the stationary distribution for
the birth-death process, let G(x, t) = Pr[Age > x] denote the age distribution at time
t. Given that the population growth rate is n̄ and the death rate is d̄, the distribution
41Averages over decades since 1950 also confirm the fact that contributions of income from property
to national have been persistently higher in more recent decades. It accounted for over 30 percent of
national income after the 1980s: 29 percent in the 1950s and 1960s, 27 percent in the 1970s, 31 percent
in the 1980s and 1990s, 32 percent in the 2000s, and 30 percent after 2010.
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evolves over a time interval ∆t as
G(x, t+ ∆t) = 1− d̄∆t1 + n̄∆t ·G(x, t) +G(x−∆x, t)−G(x, t) (48)
where 1−d̄∆t1+n̄∆t ·G(x, t) captures the change from deaths and population growth whiles the
G(x −∆x, t) − G(x, t) captures the inflow of younger people ito higher ages. Using the
taylor expansion but ignoring higher order terms, this implies that
G(x, t+ ∆t)−G(x.t)
∆t = −(n̄+ d̄)G(x, t)− fracG(x, t)−G(x−∆x, t)∆x (49)
where ∆x = ∆t. Taking the limit as ∆t→ 0 implies that
∂G(x.t)
∂t
= −(n̄+ t̄)G(x, t)− ∂G(x, t)
∂x
(50)
By setting the time derivative to zero and solving the equation, the result is the stationary
distribution for the birth-death process which is exponential:
G(x) = Pr[Age > x] = e−(n̄+d̄)x (51)
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Table 5: Summary Statistics





















1949 211.20 3.41 5.07 20.12 2.18 65.01 11.07 16.46 65.37 7.10
1950 233.90 3.76 5.04 19.79 2.12 71.87 12.24 16.42 64.43 6.91
1951 264.50 3.25 4.88 19.77 2.02 79.14 10.87 16.30 66.08 6.75
1952 282.70 3.04 4.92 19.03 2.03 82.05 10.48 16.94 65.57 7.01
1953 299.60 2.97 5.24 18.02 2.07 84.79 10.50 18.52 63.69 7.30
1954 302.60 3.07 5.72 18.31 2.37 89.16 10.43 19.40 62.14 8.03
1955 324.60 3.23 5.82 17.78 3.04 96.98 10.83 19.49 59.50 10.19
1956 348.40 3.24 6.08 17.08 2.78 101.68 11.11 20.85 58.52 9.52
1957 368.50 3.18 6.46 16.80 2.20 105.51 11.09 22.56 58.67 7.69
1958 379.50 3.06 6.80 17.13 2.49 111.84 10.37 23.07 58.12 8.44
1959 403.20 3.13 6.94 16.34 3.26 119.64 10.53 23.40 55.08 10.98
1960 422.50 3.17 7.34 15.88 2.78 123.25 10.87 25.15 54.44 9.53
1961 441.10 3.15 7.53 15.96 3.63 133.50 10.41 24.87 52.73 11.99
1962 469.10 3.20 7.80 15.60 2.87 138.25 10.85 26.47 52.95 9.73
1963 492.80 3.29 8.08 15.24 2.96 145.68 11.12 27.32 51.55 10.01
1964 528.40 3.44 8.38 14.74 3.30 157.83 11.53 28.07 49.36 11.04
1965 570.80 3.54 8.50 14.54 3.76 173.18 11.66 28.00 47.93 12.41
1966 620.60 3.34 8.62 14.15 3.44 183.35 11.29 29.18 47.89 11.64
1967 665.70 3.23 8.76 13.49 4.14 197.14 10.91 29.57 45.55 13.97
1968 730.70 3.22 8.73 12.85 4.87 216.81 10.84 29.43 43.31 16.42
1969 800.30 3.02 9.30 12.17 3.93 227.44 10.64 32.71 42.82 13.82
1970 864.60 2.81 10.21 11.39 2.41 231.95 10.48 38.07 42.47 8.99
1971 932.10 2.68 10.44 11.35 3.04 256.44 9.75 37.94 41.26 11.05
1972 1023.60 2.62 10.40 11.52 3.50 287.07 9.34 37.10 41.07 12.49
1973 1138.50 2.63 10.61 11.93 3.14 322.26 9.28 37.49 42.14 11.10
1974 1249.30 2.66 11.38 10.85 2.42 341.12 9.73 41.69 39.72 8.86
1975 1366.90 2.41 11.88 10.29 2.26 366.90 8.97 44.26 38.35 8.42
1976 1498.50 2.60 11.58 10.12 2.64 403.69 9.66 43.00 37.55 9.78
1977 1654.60 2.70 12.01 9.71 2.74 449.44 9.95 44.21 35.76 10.09
1978 1859.70 2.73 12.22 9.83 2.72 511.43 9.91 44.44 35.76 9.88
1979 2078.20 2.76 12.55 9.43 3.53 587.74 9.77 44.39 33.35 12.50
1980 2317.50 2.76 13.89 8.25 3.20 651.43 9.82 49.43 29.37 11.38
1981 2596.50 2.83 15.37 7.90 3.12 758.84 9.70 52.61 27.03 10.67
1982 2779.50 2.79 16.68 7.10 3.24 828.75 9.36 55.95 23.81 10.88
1983 2970.30 2.80 16.87 7.20 4.13 920.87 9.05 54.40 23.22 13.33
1984 3281.80 2.76 17.50 7.80 4.28 1061.60 8.53 54.11 24.12 13.23
1985 3516.30 2.77 17.50 7.70 4.89 1155.39 8.43 53.26 23.42 14.89
1986 3725.70 2.85 17.43 7.47 8.80 1361.43 7.79 47.69 20.45 24.07
1987 3955.90 2.84 16.88 7.75 3.75 1235.05 9.08 54.06 24.83 12.02
1988 4276.30 3.03 16.59 8.21 3.80 1352.79 9.59 52.45 25.94 12.02
1989 4619.90 3.42 17.19 7.93 3.33 1472.34 10.72 53.94 24.88 10.46
1990 4906.40 3.44 16.76 7.86 2.52 1500.78 11.25 54.80 25.71 8.25
1991 5073.40 3.55 15.87 7.84 2.20 1495.09 12.05 53.86 26.62 7.46
1992 5413.00 3.49 14.65 8.62 2.34 1575.59 12.00 50.34 29.62 8.04
1993 5649.00 3.62 13.88 9.28 2.70 1664.96 12.29 47.08 31.48 9.14
1994 5937.30 3.96 13.38 9.72 2.57 1759.13 13.37 45.15 32.80 8.68
1995 6281.00 4.11 13.63 9.77 2.87 1907.83 13.52 44.87 32.17 9.44
1996 6667.00 4.53 13.11 10.42 3.91 2131.60 14.18 41.02 32.58 12.23
1997 7080.70 4.77 13.00 10.45 5.15 2363.13 14.30 38.95 31.31 15.44
1998 7593.70 4.68 13.00 10.72 5.99 2611.82 13.61 37.79 31.17 17.43
1999 7988.40 4.34 12.31 11.06 6.92 2765.81 12.52 35.55 31.94 19.98
2000 8637.10 4.44 12.39 10.95 7.46 3043.29 12.59 35.17 31.07 21.17
2001 8991.60 4.11 11.92 11.61 3.89 2835.14 13.02 37.82 36.83 12.33
2002 9153.90 4.35 10.83 11.89 2.93 2747.32 14.51 36.10 39.61 9.78
2003 9491.10 4.55 10.41 11.99 3.41 2881.91 15.00 34.29 39.49 11.22
2004 10052.90 5.59 9.37 12.11 4.97 3220.45 17.45 29.24 37.81 15.50
2005 10614.00 5.45 10.25 11.47 6.50 3573.95 16.18 30.45 34.06 19.31
2006 11393.90 6.35 10.66 11.07 7.01 3997.81 18.10 30.38 31.55 19.97
2007 12000.20 6.80 11.25 9.74 7.70 4259.36 19.17 31.70 27.44 21.70
2008 12502.20 6.44 10.89 10.31 3.98 3953.44 20.37 34.44 32.59 12.59
2009 12094.80 4.58 10.45 10.80 2.18 3388.16 16.34 37.32 38.57 7.78
2010 12477.10 4.36 9.58 11.51 3.16 3569.33 15.26 33.48 40.22 11.04
2011 13254.50 5.15 9.29 12.29 3.05 3947.14 17.28 31.20 41.27 10.24
2012 13915.10 6.00 9.26 12.70 4.81 4559.96 18.31 28.26 38.74 14.68
2013 14068.40 5.61 9.04 13.14 2.96 4325.27 18.24 29.39 42.74 9.63
2014 14694.20 5.55 8.86 13.32 3.82 4635.64 17.59 28.09 42.23 12.09
2015 15357.40 5.65 8.55 13.32 4.25 4880.13 17.79 26.90 41.93 13.3966
Table 6: Capital Gains and Taxes Paid on Capital Gains in the
United States, 1954 - 2009 Dollar amounts in millions
















1954 7,157 1,010 14.1 1.88 25
1955 9,881 1,465 14.8 2.38 25
1956 9,683 1,402 14.5 2.21 25
1957 8,110 1,115 13.7 1.76 25
1958 9,440 1,309 13.9 2.02 25
1959 13,137 1,920 14.6 2.59 25
1960 11,747 1,687 14.4 2.23 25
1961 16,001 2,481 15.5 2.94 25
1962 13,451 1,954 14.5 2.3 25
1963 14,579 2,143 14.7 2.36 25
1964 17,431 2,482 14.2 2.63 25
1965 21,484 3,003 14 2.99 25
1966 21,348 2,905 13.6 2.71 25
1967 27,535 4,112 14.9 3.31 25
1968 35,607 5,943 16.7 3.91 26.9
1969 31,439 5,275 16.8 3.19 27.5
1970 20,848 3,161 15.2 2.01 32.21
1971 28,341 4,350 15.3 2.52 34.25
1972 35,869 5,708 15.9 2.9 36.5
1973 35,757 5,366 15 2.59 36.5
1974 30,217 4,253 14.1 2.02 36.5
1975 30,903 4,534 14.7 1.89 36.5
1976 39,492 6,621 16.8 2.16 39.875
1977 45,338 8,232 18.2 2.23 39.875
1978 50,526 9,104 18 2.2 39.875/33.85
1979 73,443 11,753 16 2.87 28
1980 74,132 12,459 16.8 2.66 28
1981 80,938 12,852 15.9 2.59 28.00/20.00
1982 90,153 12,900 14.3 2.77 20
1983 122,773 18,700 15.2 3.47 20
1984 140,500 21,453 15.3 3.57 20
1985 171,985 26,460 15.4 4.08 20
1986 327,725 52,914 16.1 7.35 20
1987 148,449 33,714 22.7 3.13 28
1988 162,592 38,866 23.9 3.19 28
1989 154,040 35,258 22.9 2.81 28
1990 123,783 27,829 22.5 2.13 28
1991 111,592 24,903 22.3 1.86 28.93
1992 126,692 28,983 22.9 2 28.93
1993 152,259 36,112 23.7 2.28 29.19
1994 152,727 36,243 23.7 2.16 29.19
1995 180,130 44,254 24.6 2.43 29.19
1996 260,696 66,396 25.5 3.33 29.19
1997 364,829 79,305 21.7 4.38 29.19/21.19
1998 455,223 89,069 19.6 5.18 21.19
1999 552,608 111,821 20.2 5.91 21.19
2000 644,285 127,297 19.8 6.47 21.19
2001 349,441 65,668 18.8 3.4 21.17
2002 268,615 49,122 18.3 2.52 21.16
2003 323,306 51,340 15.9 2.9 21.05/16.05
2004 499,154 73,213 14.7 4.21 16.05
2005 690,152 102,174 14.8 5.47 16.05
2006 798,214 117,793 14.8 5.97 15.7
2007 924,164 137,141 14.8 6.59 15.7
2008 497,841 68,791 13.8 3.48 15.35
2009 263,460 36,686 13.9 1.89 15.35
1 Source of Data: Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, June 8, 2012.
2 Data include returns with positive total net capital gains, both short and long-term. Data for each year
include some late-filed prior year returns. The maximum rate is the effective rate applying to high-income
taxpayers, including effects of provisions that alter effective rates for significant amounts of gains. Maximum
rates include the effects exclusions (1954-1986), alternative tax rates (1954-1986, 1991-1997), the minimum
tax (1970-1978), the alternative minimum tax (1979 -), income tax surchages (1968-1970), and phaseouts of
itemized deductions (3% 1991-2005, 2% 2006-2007 and 1% 2008-2009). The maximum statutory rate on long-
term gains was 28% starting 1991, 20% starting May 1997 and 15% starting May 2003. The 2009 maximum
rate included the effect of the 1% itemized deduction phaseout, computed as 15.35=15+0.01×35. Starting
1997, gains on collectibles and certain depreciation recapture are taxed at ordinary rates, up to maximum
rates of 28% on collectibles and 25% on recapture. Midyear rate changes occurred in 1978, 1981, 1997 and
2003. Estimates are subject to revision.
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Table 7: Actual and Projected Capital Gains Realizations and Tax
Receipts, 1995 - 2014













1995 180.13 2.43 39.84795 6.75
1996 260.695619 3.33 54.2179 8.26
1997 364.829 4.38 72.20505 9.79
1998 455.223 5.18 83.6988 10.10
1999 552.608 5.91 99.3074 11.29
2000 644.285 6.47 118.7852 11.83
2001 349.441 3.40 99.56395 10.01
2002 268.615 2.52 58.2223 6.78
2003 323.306 2.90 50.1201 6.31
2004 499.1537 4.21 61.18285 7.58
2005 690.1521 5.47 86.24545 9.26
2006 798.214 5.97 109.20255 10.46
2007 924.164 6.59 126.4996 10.87
2008 497.8407 3.48 106.3835 9.29
2009 263.460082 1.89 54.34375 5.94
2010 394.229541 2.6 44.88635 5.00
2011 404.3443 2.55 54.5958 5.00
2012 669.5572 4.12 67.548 5.97
2013 416.473373 2.48 104.21964 7.92
Projected
2014 590.4547194 3.50 89.75894659 6.63
1 Source: Congressional Buget Office
2 Notes: Capital gains realizations are the sum of net capital gains from tax returns reporting a net gain. Data
for realizations after 2011 and data for tax receipts in all years are estimated or projected by the CBO. Data on
realization before 2012 are estimated by the Treasury Department
a Calenda year basis
b Fiscal year basis. This measure is CBO’s estimate of when tax liabilities resulting from capital gains are paid
to the Treasury.
68
























10% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10%
15% 0% 15% 15% 15% 15%
25% 15% 25% 25% 25% 25%
28% 15% 28% 25% 28% 28%
33% 15% 33% 25% 28% 28%
35% 15% 35% 25% 28% 28%
39.60% 20% 39.60% 25% 28% 28%
1 Source of Data: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-08-66.pdf
69
References
[1] Facundo Alvaredo, Anthony Barnes Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez.
The world top incomes database. 2011.
[2] Robert J Antonio. Piketty’s nightmare capitalism the return of rentier society and
de-democratization. Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews, 43(6):783–790,
2014.
[3] Anthony B Atkinson. Income inequality in oecd countries: Data and explanations.
CESifo Economic Studies, 49(4):479–513, 2003.
[4] Anthony B Atkinson. Top incomes in the uk over the 20th century. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 168(2):325–343, 2005.
[5] Anthony B Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez. Top incomes over a
century or more. Journal of Economic Literature, 49:3–71, 2011.
[6] Robert J Barro. Inequality and growth in a panel of countries. Journal of economic
growth, 5(1):5–32, 2000.
[7] Jess Benhabib and Alberto Bisin. The distribution of wealth: Intergenerational
transmission and redistributive policies. Work. Pap., New York Univ, 2007.
[8] Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, and Shenghao Zhu. The distribution of wealth and
fiscal policy in economies with finitely lived agents. Econometrica, 79(1):123–157,
2011.
[9] Roy G Blakey. The revenue act of 1921. The American Economic Review, 12(1):75–
108, 1922.
[10] John Bates Clark. The distribution of wealth. Macmillan New York, 1899.
[11] Joseph J Cordes, Robert D Ebel, and Jane Gravelle. The encyclopedia of taxation
& tax policy. The Urban Insitute, 2005.
70
[12] Esther Duflo and Abhijit V Banerjee. Inequality and growth: What can the data
say? 2000.
[13] Kristin J Forbes. A reassessment of the relationship between inequality and growth.
American economic review, pages 869–887, 2000.
[14] GDC. Profits from sale of capital assets as income: Taxable under sixteenth amend-
ment. Michigan Law Review, pages 854–858, 1921.
[15] Charles I Jones. Pareto and piketty: The macroeconomics of top income and wealth
inequality. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(1):29–46, 2015.
[16] Nicholas Kaldor. Capital accumulation and economic growth. Springer, 1961.
[17] Ravi Kanbur and Joseph E Stiglitz. Dynastic inequality, mobility and equality of
opportunity. 2015.
[18] Simon Kuznets. Economic growth and income inequality. The American economic
review, 45(1):1–28, 1955.
[19] Simon Kuznets and Elizabeth Jenks. Shares of upper income groups in income and
savings. 1953.
[20] Hongyi Li and Heng-fu Zou. Income inequality is not harmful for growth: theory
and evidence. Review of development economics, 2(3):318–334, 1998.
[21] Fred J Marcus and Douglas K Freeman. Taxpayer relief act of 1997. Journal of
Financial Service Professionals, 51(6):30, 1997.
[22] Benjamin Moll. Inequality and financial development: A power-law kuznets curve.
Princeton University Note, 2012.
[23] United Nations. System of National Accounts. 2008.
[24] Makoto Nirei et al. Pareto distributions in economic growth models. Institute of
Innovation Research Working Paper, (09-05), 2009.
71
[25] Bureau of Economic Analysis. National income and product accounts. 2015. Online;
accessed October 5, 2015.
[26] Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 94th Congress 2d Sess. General explanation
of the tax reform act of 1976, 1976.
[27] U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Tax Analysis. Capital gains and taxes
paid on capital gains for returns with positive net capital gains, 1954–2009. 2012.
Online; October 5, 2015.
[28] Congressional Budget Office. The budget and economic outlook, fiscal years 2013
to 2023: Supplemental information for chapter 1, february 5, 2014. 2014. Online;
accessed October 5, 2015.
[29] Vilfredo Pareto. Course of political economy, 1896.
[30] Roberto Perotti. Growth, income distribution, and democracy: what the data say.
Journal of Economic growth, 1(2):149–187, 1996.
[31] Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. Is inequality harmful for growth? The Amer-
ican Economic Review, pages 600–621, 1994.
[32] Thomas Piketty. Les hauts revenus en france au xx siècle. Paris: Grasset, 2001.
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